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Introduction 
Every year, more than 70 million people in the US – one-third of all children and one-fifth 
of all adults – are covered by Medicaid, the jointly administered state-federal health insurance plan 
for low-income and disabled individuals (Office of the Actuary, 2016). As an entitlement program, 
Medicaid employs a means test to define eligibility for the program; if an individual is determined 
to be eligible, s/he is entitled to enrollment in the program and receipt of its benefits. However, 
monthly enrollments fluctuate as people experience changes in their income, health status, and 
family composition, and as State programs work to keep up with review and processing of 
applications, claims, and renewals. In a program as large and complicated as Medicaid, it is thus 
difficult for States to determine who is eligible and who is not. As a result, all State programs 
report varying levels of coverage take-up (proportion of eligible residents who enroll in the 
program), churn of beneficiaries (movement of individuals on-and-off the program over long 
periods of time), and fraud (ineligible residents enrolled in the program).  
These program classification errors result in financial and health care instability for 
families and individuals who experience them, and unpredictability and inefficiency in the State’s 
administrative tasks and budgets. As the nation’s (and most States’) largest single health insurer, 
and a program that accounts for more than a quarter of total State spending (Rudowitz, 2016), 
Medicaid’s operations are of great concern to public administration. Given the seemingly 
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straightforward rules of the program – i.e., if you meet these criteria, you are entitled to benefits – 
and the problems associated with classification error, the phenomena of low take-up, churn, and 
fraud are often referred to as “unintended consequences”, “implementation failures”, or 
“inefficiencies” in the program. Seeking to find solutions to these problems, researchers and 
administrators of State Medicaid programs have spent considerable time and resources asking 
question such as, How can States eliminate fraud? What are the characteristics of the people most 
likely to churn, miss take-up, or commit fraud? Why do different States have different rates of 
churn, fraud, take-up?  
 
Gaps in Literature on Classification Error 
Despite an abundance of research geared toward answering questions about program 
enrollment (in Medicaid as well as other public benefit programs), our understanding about the 
causes and consequences of program classification error remains limited. This shortfall limits our 
ability to identify policy levers that might be used to minimize error and (arguably) improve system 
performance. Existing studies on program enrollment share three primary characteristics that limit 
their ability to inform the administration of Medicaid policy.  
 
1. Estimate distribution, not dynamics. 
While most research refers to “take-up rate” or “churn rate” as the measure of interest, what 
is actually estimated and reported is the prevalence or proportion of people who fall in a 
particular enrollment-eligibility category at a particular time. This is useful information to 
have, but it is distinct from the rate at which people move in or out of a category. Snapshots 
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of prevalence over time fail to illuminate the core dynamics of the Medicaid enrollment 
process, i.e., how people move across categories over time. 
 
2. Describe who; do not explain why. 
While existing studies provide some insight into who falls into different enrollment 
classification states, they do not shed much light on how people get there. In part, this is 
because they model the outcome of interest as a function of individual characteristics (e.g., 
gender, ethnicity, employment, health status). But the means test is not instantaneously and 
omnisciently applied to individuals based on their characteristics, it is a rule/institution 
implemented through the State. When structural elements of the enrollment process such 
as eligibility criteria and continuous enrollment period are included (Herd, DeLeire, 
Harvey, & Moynihan, 2013), they are treated as exogenous variables to be controlled, 
rather than contextual factors affecting decision making and behavior. By focusing on 
individuals rather than policies, current research fails to provide insight about the origins 
of enrollment patterns, including classification errors. 
 
3. Model discrete outcomes; not related patterns. 
In existing research, the outcome of interest in any given study is either take-up, missed 
take-up, fraud, or churn. This approach ignores the fact that the enrollment phenomena are 
related through the program structure, so a policy change affecting the level of one outcome 
is likely to have affects on the others, as well. For example, if the State makes changes to 
the enrollment process that results in a greater proportion of eligible individuals taking up 
coverage, a smaller proportion of the population will miss taking up. Such a policy might 
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also result in fewer people moving on and off the program. It is valuable to decision makers 
to know how structural changes will affect all of the enrollment patterns, not just one in 
particular.  
Based on these characteristics, the existing literature could be organized in the following way:  
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The characteristics outlined above reflect a more general limitation of the current research 
on program enrollment: an inability to capture and model the complexity of the Medicaid system. 
The operating assumptions of these studies reflect an underlying Cartesian logic; that is, they take 
the perspective that the way to understand some aspect of the world is to break it into its constituent 
parts and study them piece by piece in order to determine cause and effect. This approach certainly 
has its place in scientific inquiry, and has provided the basis for much of what we understand about 
many social phenomena, including Medicaid enrollment. However, deterministic, closed-form, 
static perspectives and analytic models make it difficult to capture the complexity and dynamics 
of implementing a benefit program. In breaking time into snapshots, feedback dynamics into linear 
cause and effect, people into characteristics, contexts into controls (variables), and compound 
patterns into discrete outcomes, existing studies seek to simplify the complexity that is a 
“profoundly characteristic feature of the real” (Rescher, 1998, p. xiii). Unfortunately, the behavior 
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of complex systems cannot be perfectly understood just because their constituent parts are. People 
move within the Medicaid system in different ways over time, through a series of actions and 
interactions with other actors and rules, within a rich social, economic, and political environment. 
The enrollment patterns observed in these systems are not just outcomes; they are dynamics. The 
system is not just multi-actor, multi-rule, or multi-dimensional; it is complex.  
 
Research Questions and Aims 
Building on the groundwork laid by previous studies on enrollment and classification 
errors, this research seeks to examine how people move on and off the Medicaid rolls. In order to 
fill gaps left by previous research, this study takes a systems perspective, focusing on the properties 
and behavior of the program system as a whole, rather than on the behaviors and attributes of the 
individual parts. From a systems perspective, understanding churn, fraud, and take-up requires 
direct attention to and representation of the complexity and dynamics of Medicaid enrollment 
phenomena.  
A conceptual model of the Medicaid enrollment system is useful to consider, What are the 
characteristics of Medicaid enrollment implementation as a complex human system? What makes 
Medicaid enrollment complex? How are actors, institutions, and environments interconnected and 
how do they interact in this system? What does the structure of the system suggest about how it 
works and how it behaves? 
An operationalization of the conceptual model through a simple system dynamics 
simulation can be used to understand, What is the mechanism by which Medicaid program 
enrollment works? What are the characteristic processes of this system? How does the feedback 
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structure of the system play out? How do people move on and off the Medicaid program? How do 
classification errors arise? 
By experimenting with and testing assumptions in the system dynamics model, this 
research seeks to understand, What are the effects of pulling different policy levers within the 
Medicaid enrollment system? How do enrollment patterns change under different eligibility 
criteria, determination practices, and enrollment procedures and rules? What are the effects of 
these policies under different environmental and population conditions? 
Ultimately, the goal of this research is to provide a model for decision makers to test 
assumptions and experiment with policy options in the context of diverse State Medicaid 
programs. 
 
Conceptual model: A recursive framework for implementation 
The central claim of this research is that deterministic methods and Cartesian thinking have 
limited our understanding of classification error in Medicaid enrollment because they frame it as 
a problematic outcome resulting from an aggregated set of independent variables. Because 
Medicaid enrollment is an ongoing process involving interactions among a diverse set of actors 
and institutions within rich environmental conditions, classification error is better understood and 
investigated as a manifestation of the dynamics that characterize a complex human system. Indeed, 
this problem is just one of a type of dilemmas with which we deal in public administration; i.e., 
wicked problems that are resistant to technological control or resolution because of complex 
interdependencies (Churchman, 1967). Traditional Cartesian logic is based on an assumption that 
complexity must be broken up, reduced, and simplified to be understood and addressed. In 
contrast, a systems logic holds that the whole is other than the sum of the parts (Koffka, 1935), 
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and as such, its parts and relationships must be studied in context and over time to understand the 
underlying structure and system behavior.  
Rigorous inquiry requires abstraction from reality to a model of some kind in order to be 
useful (and wrong) (Box & Draper, 1987). Instead of an abstraction of complexity that is reduced 
down to its parts and the associations among them, a systems perspective requires that an 
abstraction represent the structural interdependencies and feedback that produce and reproduce 
system behavior. Additionally, because wicked problems occur within complex systems of human 
action, they are subject to the law of requisite variety: the possible states of the filter and control 
mechanism in a system must be greater than or equal to the possible states of the system itself 
(Ashby, 1956; Beer, 1972). 
 
What makes Medicaid enrollment complex? What are the characteristics of Medicaid enrollment 
implementation as a complex system?  
Medicaid enrollment relies on the means test and its implementation. Implementation is 
said to begin with the specification of what government is going to do (Smith & Larimer, 2009, p. 
155) and end with the effect of the action on society (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). However, 
public administration scholars widely acknowledge that implementation is neither a linear process, 
nor a discrete phase in policy or management practice (e.g., deLeon, 1999). The process of 
implementation is ongoing as rules are defined, enacted, and revisited; and as actors of various 
kinds interpret, process, and respond to those rules. While scholars commonly refer to 
implementation as complex, treatment of the phenomena continues to involve a reduction of the 
complexity into parts related through a deterministic structure (e.g., Sandfort & Moulton, 2015). 
Similarly, the word “system” is used generically to refer to an institutional or social space, but the 
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structure of that space, its actors, its boundaries, and its behaviors are not specified (e.g., O'Toole, 
2000). 
A complex system is not just multi-actor, multi-level, or multi-dimensional. The Cartesian 
approach of adding more variables, nesting them within groups, and measuring assocations, even 
over time, is complicated, but it is not truly complex. A complex system has these characteristics: 
o It includes diverse entities or elements whose actions are interdependent within a contact 
structure that has broad dimensional boundaries (Miller & Page, 2007). 
o Its behavior arises from its endogenous structure. Patterns are difficult to predict or trace 
back to specific actors, rules, or actions, and system behavior cannot be predicted by the 
behavior of the individual entities. Higher-order functions and patterns emerge from the 
interactions (not aggregations) of individual elements (Page, 2010). 
o Time and time steps matter because they inform (though do not determine) how 
interactions occur and patterns unfold. Interactions among elements are not necessarily 
linear or consistent in their form, so system behavior may change over time and through 
time. Dynamic interactions make it difficult to assess tradeoffs or identify optima (Miller 
& Page, 2007). 
 
Additionally, scholars note that social human systems demonstrate the following features:  
o The system and the elements within it have purposes, and those purposes likely do not 
always align. As a result, local and global behaviors may vary widely (Ackoff, 1994).  
o The guiding rules and behaviors of the system are adaptive; they change as actors learn 
(Miller & Page, 2007). 
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o The system tends to self-organize and reproduce around the diverse, dynamic actions of its 
elements, making it resilient to perturbations (Miller & Page, 2007; Ackoff, 1994). 
 
These characteristics suggest that many features that are often treated as “control variables” 
or are left out of a model all together are instrumental to understanding the phenomena of interest. 
For example, if actors and behaviors are interconnected and interdependent, then economic, 
political, and social conditions, administrative rules and practices, and sources of learning should 
all be endogenous elements of any model (theoretical or empirical) of a system. Furthermore, 
because system behavior arises from its structure, and complex human systems are adaptive and 
self-organizing, models should allow for both emergent behaviors and emergent (or, more 
precisely, latent) structures to develop. Cartesian models of Medicaid enrollment specify an 
outcome and a structure (i.e., functional form relating the variables), which prevents any insights 
about self-organizing patterns or latent relationships among the system elements.  
Since the complexity of our social world is governed by the law of requisite variety, to 
make a contribution to scholarly and practical knowledge about Medicaid program enrollment, 
and to address limitations of previous research, a systems conceptualization of enrollment must 
explicitly represent complexity, specifically by including the following:  
 
1. Rates of change over time.  
While snapshots of the distribution and characteristics of elements within a system may be 
sufficient to understand variation and associations among those elements, they cannot 
account for non-linear changes over time or recursive relationships among elements and 
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time. Knowing about the actual rates at which people move on and off the Medicaid 
program is necessary to understanding the core dynamics of the processes of enrollment. 
 
2. Broader explanatory boundaries.  
Complex system behavior is explained primarily through the endogenous structure of the 
system itself. Thus, institutional arrangements and environmental contexts must be 
included with individual characteristics and behaviors, and their interactions and 
interdependencies represented through appropriate feedback designations. Because the 
process of program enrollment involves interaction among these elements, any model of 
enrollment phenomena that does not include the recursive relationships among 
beneficiaries and policies in context will fail to illuminate leverage points in the system. 
 
3. Multiple, compound patterns.  
Complex systems demonstrate dynamic behaviors. Some of those behaviors may be 
deemed problematic because of associated social or economic costs, but ultimately, all 
behaviors are simply effects of the interconnections and interdependencies among the 
elements of the system itself. Thus, any changes in the structure of the system that result 
in changes in one pattern are likely to result in changes in the others. Missed take-up, churn, 
and fraud are therefore understood as different manifestations of a compound 
implementation process; a process that also includes the “successful outcomes” of 
enrollment among eligible individuals and continuous coverage through other insurance. 
 
How can complex human system concepts be formally organized?  
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 Among scholars trained in a Cartesian approach to scientific inquiry, a common concern 
with systems models is that they are too broad and include too much to be useful, and create 
analytical problems by including multiple units of analysis. However, systems models can be 
formalized in logically consistent ways that maintain fidelity of concept and analytic tractability. 
Bunge’s standard model of a concrete system (Bunge, 2004) is an elegant formalization that can 
be applied in a range of systems contexts:  
 Instead of a vector of variables that denote the attributes or decisions along one dimensional 
unit (e.g., a person, an organization), Bunge’s model defines a matrix of variables that are 
organized according to attributes of actor (component), context (environment), action rules 
(structure), and interaction processes (mechanism). The elements of this matrix necessarily interact 
dynamically over time; they are not assumed to relate to each other through a pre-defined 
functional form, which may or may not include a time designation. Lastly, rather than a dependent 
variable, the “outcome” in Bunge’s representation is a compound manifestation of the interaction 
patterns produced by the elements of the system. With the system itself as the unit of analysis, and 
distinctions drawn among different levels of action, this formalization distills complexity instead 
Figure 2.  Bunge’s Basic Model of a Concrete System, µ(σ) (Bunge 2004, 188) 
µ(σ) = dynamic of{C(σ), E(σ), S(σ), M(σ)}, 
over time t, where the elements of the model are: 
C = set of parts or components of the system 
E = the collection of environmental items that act on and/or are acted upon by the 
system 
S = the structure or set of bonds or ties that hold the components of the system 
together; organization, architecture 
M = the mechanisms or characteristic processes of the system 
And  
µ(σ) = self-production and control of system 
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of reducing it.1 Mechanism is a particularly useful construct in modeling a complex human system 
because interaction processes are how learning and adaptation occur.  
In this research, instead of modeling churn, take-up, and fraud as discrete phenomena, they 
are treated as manifestations of a compound self-production pattern in the Medicaid enrollment 
system. Rather than a means test, the mechanism by which people move among eligibility and 
enrollment states within the Medicaid program system may be thought of as a means negotiation. 
The mechanism is the characteristic interaction processes by which institutional arrangements 
(eligibility criteria, determination procedures, enrollment period) are negotiated by (and with) 
individuals (both potential beneficiaries and organizational actors) in the context of social and 
economic signals (political control, job growth).  
The mechanism is the driving force in the system’s self-production. Some of the 
mechanismic (Bunge, 2004) interactions may result in policy resistance (Sterman, 2000; 
Meadows, 1982), intervention-dampening patterns that arise in response to the system itself. For 
example, while one may think that the Medicaid means test would produce only patterns of proper 
program classification (i.e., enrollment among eligible individuals, non-enrollment among 
ineligible individuals), interaction processes drive the production of a compound pattern of 
classification, which includes some “error” (i.e., enrollment among ineligible individuals, non-
enrollment among eligible individuals). This indicates that the typical characterization of these 
phenomena as unintended consequences, implementation failures, or inefficiencies is flawed 
because it implies that such outcomes are avoidable; that they are problems to be solved. 
Mechanistically, that may not be true. 
																																																						
1 For more on levels of action and distinctions among logical types, see Roach & Bednar, 1997. 
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Conceptualizing Medicaid program enrollment within a complex human system 
framework also highlights the lack of conceptual clarity about what the enrollment phenomena are 
and how they are named. The rates at which individuals take up coverage or miss take up of 
coverage is clear enough. However, fraud is a loaded term, implying devious behavior and 
deceitful motivation on the part of the beneficiary. The rate of spurious enrollment would more 
neutrally reflect this manifestation of the system’s patterns. While the term churn is used in the 
literature to refer to any kind of movement on and off the program, rates of churn due to a change 
in eligibility are a distinct policy challenge from rates of churn due to determination rejection. In 
addition to conceptual rigor, a systems perspective provides a framework for inquiry that 
emphasizes hypothesis generation (rather than hypothesis testing) and simulated explorations of 
what if scenarios about how policy decisions might play out in complex systems.   
 
System Dynamics Procedure: Operationalizing a systems model for hypothesis exploration 
and policy experimentation 
Thanks to advancements in computational methods and improvements in computing 
power, policy scholars now possess the tools to build on the insights gained from deterministic 
models by simulating the complexity of public program implementation and watching the behavior 
of the system as a whole. In this research, a system dynamics (SD) model is used to build an 
empirical proof of the complex human systems concept of Medicaid enrollment. The simulation 
is useful both for exploring how the mechanism of the Medicaid enrollment system works, and for 
experimenting with various policy actions to identify possible leverage points in the system.  
By expanding the boundaries of the enrollment models to include structural elements as 
endogenous features of the classification problem, a system dynamics approach allows for the 
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exploration of dynamic complexity and feedback structures that make enrollment patterns difficult 
to explain or predict. SD modeling may shed light on sources of policy resistance, encourages and 
supports transparency in assumptions and decision making, produces plausible ranges of outcomes 
under different assumptions, and demonstrates tradeoffs among various policy options, revealing 
possible policy leverage points and aiding in real-time decision making.  
 While systems modeling is different from Cartesian modeling, there is a robust literature 
of procedures and protocols in systems science. Sterman (2000) serves as a standard in procedure 
for research using SD methods.  
 
1. Reference Mode, Dynamic Problem Definition 
The dynamic problem of interest is how some members of a State population are distributed 
in enrollment states not consistent with their eligibility status, and how they move among 
various state of enrollment. Because States have different environmental conditions 
(economically, politically, socially), different populations, and different eligibility and 
determination policies, the distribution of their populations across enrollment categories 
and movement among them is different. All States demonstrate dynamic behavior in terms 
of Medicaid classification and enrollment over time.  
To be more clear in identifying and reporting the behaviors of interest in this 
problem, “rate” will refer only to a variable change over time (people/month). Spurious 
enrollment will be used to refer to people who are enrolled in the program, though they are 
not eligible for it. This to provide a more general description of the state that allows for 
both motivated action on the part of the individual (“fraud”) and administrative errors made 
in the determination process. This model will also distinguish between the dynamics of 
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eligibility churn and determination churn in order to capture movement on-and-off the 
program that is associated with an individual’s changing financial/household conditions 
(eligibility) and movement associated with errors or delays in reevaluation and enrollment 
in the program (determination).   
 
2. Model boundary 
In order to capture the effects of Medicaid eligibility and determination policies on program 
enrollment and classification dynamics (and the associated costs), the time horizon needs 
to be long enough to capture delays associated with passage, implementation, and 
information dissemination regarding changes in policy. From the perspective of the State, 
a useful initial model would likely need to include 4-5 budget cycles (with each budget 
period lasting two years). For planning purposes, the time horizon would run from 2002-
2042 to include a range of economic and policy changes both historically, and into the 
future. (Because the origins of the problematic phenomena almost certainly arose shortly 
after initiation of the program, 1965-1982 could be the start of the time frame, depending 
on the State of use.) Tracking behavior per month is the relevant time unit because 











3. Dynamic Hypothesis 
A general systems organization contends that Medicaid classification implementation is 
characterized as a self-producing and -controlling system of dynamic, recursive processes 
in which interdependencies among a set of elements – individuals, institutional 
arrangements, and environments – create multiple related patterns in the classification of 
citizens over time. Bunge (2004) refers to the compound characteristic process of a 
system’s (re)production as the system’s mechanism. To capture the ongoing, purposeful 
processes of both individuals and States reviewing eligibility and benefits, the 
characteristic process in this model is referred to as the sorting mechanism (“means 
negotiation” in the previous section).  
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(see 5. Policy Experimentation) 
  
 
Data sources: State statutes on Medicaid (eligibility, determination practices), administrative 
Medicaid data (applications, enrollments), Census data on income and employment.  
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A State’s enrolled Medicaid population may be imagined as an accumulation of 
people inside a bathtub. Previous studies describe who is in the tub (i.e., their gender, age, 
ethnicity), but provide very little insight on how they flowed in, how long they stay inside, 
or how they drain out. The number of pipes in and out, and what controls the valves is 
largely unknown; in other words, the sorting mechanism is poorly understood.  
Policies are institutionalized, purposeful actions. They are rules, procedures, 
practices, arrangements, and structures designed to consistently induce and regulate certain 
behaviors among defined agents. In other words, policies are mechanisms; policy design 
is mechanism design.  
Forms of policy resistance, such as classification error occurring in Medicaid 
enrollment implementation, arise from the interaction, interdependence, and 
interconnections among the individuals, the policies regarding eligibility and 
determination, and the State’s economic, political, and social environments, over time. The 
same mechanism that the State uses to fulfill public service demand through certain 
feedback structures is also characterized by feedback structures that dampen the intended 
policy effects, producing resistance in the sorting mechanism. For example, while 
verification procedures are intended to reduce the incidence of spurious enrollment, they 
also impose administrative burden (Moynihan, Herd, & Harvey, 2014) on applicants and 
potential applicants, increasing the incidence of missed take-up.  
 
4. Formulate, Test SD simulation  
To build confidence in the model’s assumptions and specification, the former deputy 
director of Ohio Medicaid, the executive director of the Joint Legislative Commission on 
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Medicaid, and several current and former beneficiaries serve as consultants and reviewers 
of this modeling process. The model will be calibrated to historical Ohio Medicaid data 
from 2008-2014, then tested by changing assumptions to reflect policy changes made with 
the expansion of the program in 2014. Additionally, model sensitivity will be tested by 
changing economic conditions; the goal is to see if (and to what degree) the model 
reproduces the “automatic stabilizer” effect of Medicaid during a recession.   
 
5. Policy Experimentation 
Ultimately, the purpose of an SD simulation is to provide a virtual world in which decision 
makers can explore what if scenarios without any social, political, or economic costs. The 
mechanism by which individuals are sorted through the Medicaid system is policy 
actionable in two fundamental ways: 1) Through rules relating to eligibility, and 2) through 
rules relating the application and determination. Drawing on federal guidelines and State 
statutes over the last 20 years, a range of policy interventions will be tested:  
 
Changes to Eligibility 
- Number of eligibility categories (number of different ways an individual can be deemed 
eligible) 
- Income eligibility threshold (percent federal poverty level) 
 
Changes to Application and Determination 
- Application method (online, paper application, provider claim, navigator, benefits 
coordinator) 
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- Number of questions on application 
- Number of application languages available 
- Unified application (linked to other public benefit programs) 
- Interview required 
- Income verification required 
- Employment verification required 
- Drug test required 
- Residency verification required 
- Period of continuous enrollment (period without needing to re-apply) 
- Enrollment through provider claim (presumptive eligibility) 
- Automatic enrollment (administrative enrollment) 
- Managed care contracting 
 
Expected Simulation Insights 
 The goal of this research is to use SD simulation to illuminate and understand the feedback 
structure and dynamic behavior of the Medicaid enrollment system and its mechanism. This 
includes insights about:   
o Rates of take-up, spurious enrollment, missed enrollment, eligibility churn, and 
determination churn, not just prevalence; 
o The flow of citizens across different stages of eligibility and enrollment in Medicaid; 
o Estimates of the prevalence, incidence, and duration of enrollment classification 
outcomes; 
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o Estimates of the administrative costs associated with distribution and movement of 
people within the system each month; 
o The extent to which observed patterns are manifestations of the mechanism (policy) 
design itself versus agent behavior or exogenous shocks (economic change). 
 
Policy design is mechanism design, so understanding how mechanisms operate within 
systems of collective action helps policy makers take more purposeful and well thought-out 
actions. Policy simulations allow decision makers to alter underlying assumptions and mechanisms 
to assess the consequences of their decisions across long time horizons in silica with zero social 
costs. Thus, a collectively developed simulation can be used to clarify values, make assumptions 
explicit, and make updates use of the evidence based in program planning, administrative decision-
making, and performance evaluation. Thinking about implementation in terms of mechanisms 
allows researchers to study the interaction of evidence-based practices and contextual variations, 
and thus trace the roots of policy resistance. 
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